ReportNorthwest Airlines chronological log of hijacking of Flight 305, November 24/25, 1971 (CST)24 November 1971page 5 of 7
reportLegibility: medium

Part 110, page 141

DB Cooper-438

Document date 24 November 1971

Open in FBI Vault (Part 110, page 141 of the PDF)

FBI 164-81, Vault Part 110 p. 141 (DB Cooper-438), Report, dated 24 Nov 1971 — cooper.theunsolved.net/parts/Cooper-Part-110/pages/141

Transcript

The scan is the source; the transcript is machine-generated from it.

Cabin lights ON in forward cabin, OFF in aft cabin. Curtain between first class and tourist section was closed; crew could not see whether HJ was still aboard.

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2222* 8:22 PM PST

Lost communications on NW A communications frequency (131.9); 'phone-patch with SEA ARINC established. Flight now 23 DME S PDX at 10,000', 40,000# fuel aboard, 165KIAS, FF and con- figuration remained the same. Crew had previously been ad- vised to switch to ARINC on 131.8 when NWA communications lost. MSPFO and MSPFD communicated with flight and SEA ARINC thereafter on this 'phone-patch arrangement. SEADD had been monitoring all communications with flight and assis- ting in all other matters.

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[REDACTED] had also been very actively participating throughout the high-jacking. He had taken money and 'chutes to air- plane at SEA, coordinated with crew, fuel trucks, etc.

[REDACTED] later called BNL at RNO and briefed them on all of the HJ's demands, procedures to be followed at RNO, etc.

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2252 8:52 PM PST

Flight over EUG VOR, 10,000', 170KIAS, fuel aboard 33,500#, FP and configuration remained the same. Advised that they had had no communications with the HJ for "about the last 55 minutes" despite several attempts on cockpit-to-cabin inter-phone and PA system. Crew was assured that fuel was more than adequate to get to RNO; that RNO weather was good, etc. SEADD had also been actively following and participating in these events.

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2328 9:28 PM PST

Over IFR, 10,000', TAT -5°, 170KIAS, fuel aboard 27,500#, FP and configuration the same. Some airframe icing being experienced. Engine anti-icing ON for appreciable length of time, wing AI on "intermittently". Crew seemed slightly concerned about this, but were assured that it was no problem.

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2330* 9:30 PM PST

[REDACTED] asked that we sug- gest that flight crew slowly lower cabin temperature as much as practicable (to slow HJ's reflexes).

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2335* 9:35 PM PST

MSPFO suggested a slow climb to 11,000' at Captain's dis- cretion, to induce as much hypoxia in HJ as possible (flight had previously been suggested to consider climb to as high as practicable--but that they would probably be performance lim- ited to not much above 17,000'--but not above 12,500'; Latter upper limit to prevent a cabin oxygen mask drop from excit- ing HJ. 11,000' also needed for adequate terrain clearance RBL-RNO.

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