Part 54, page 64
Document date 13 December 1971
FBI 164-81, Vault Part 54 p. 64 (DB Cooper-22990), News clipping, dated 13 Dec 1971 — cooper.theunsolved.net/parts/Cooper-Part-54/pages/64
Transcript
The scan is the source; the transcript is machine-generated from it.
(indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)
The Oregonian Portland, Oregon
Date: 12/13/71, pg. 31 Edition: Author: Editor: Title:
Character: or Classification: Submitting Office: ☐ Being Investigated
/6 4 - 1/ Sub I [illegible handwriting]
DB Cooper-22990
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D.B. Cooper slipped by Some airlines don't cooperate in anti-hijacking plan By LEVERETT RICHARDS
THE federal anti-hijacking program has apparently been effective in screening out potential hijackers and other criminals in its first year of oper- ation.
But not all airlines are cooperating in the program — including one of the eight passenger lines serving Portland — points out Jay Adsen, regional chief of the air transportation se- curity division of the Federal Avia- tion Administration.
Adsen stated po- sitively that if the screening system had been used by Northwest Airlines personnel on pas- sengers boarding their Flight 305 in Portland the night of Wednesday, Nov. 24, the ill-famed $200,000 hijacker would have been caught.
Northwest Airlines does not have a magnetometer in Portland to detect concealed weapons on passengers. Ter- minal personnel were too busy with ther flights to screen passengers board- ing the Boeing 727 — including one D.B. Cooper who bought a ticket at the terminal and delivered his ticket stub at the boarding door. Temporary facili- ties used during construction added to Northwest's problems that night, Port- land managers explain.
Northwest's terminal personnel are trained in the screening procedures and do use them under normal condi- tions, however, NWA spokesmen em- phasized.
All airlines at Portland either own magnetometers or share them with oth- er airlines, but the role of the magnetic detector has been greatly over-empha- sized, Adsen said.
"Generally, the magnetometer is used as a final step to confirm or dis- prove doubts about a passenger," Ad- sen said.
The system depends primarily upon training of airline personnel and secur- ity agents to recognize certain traits typical of potential hijackers.
This "behavioral profile," worked out by the FBI and specialized psychol- ogists, is a well-kept secret.
"If a potential hijacker knew what we were looking for he would figure out a way to beat the system," Adsen ex- plained.
But it works, Adsen says, pointing to the record. In the month of October — a dull month — 103 "incidents" were recorded at the eight airports in the western region.
Some 36 incidents were related to po- tential hijackings; 25 led to arrests for possession of narcotics, mostly mari- juana; 18 aliens were arrested for ille- gal entry; 4 wanted men were arrest- ed.
Of the 36 incidents involving airline offenses, 10 involved bomb threats; were arrested for trying to board a[illegible] airline carrying a concealed weapon — a federal misdemeanor; one was ar- rested for "threatening use of a weap- on;" 3 for threatening air piracy; 4 for making false statements regarding air piracy; 10 for creating disturbances involving airline personnel.
More than 1,000 arrests were made nationally, more than 400 for posses- sion of drugs, about 300 for possession of firearms.
Portland reported four incidents in October; including two wanted men ar- rested; one alien charged with illegal entry; and one man for creating a dis- turbance. Twenty-eight arrests have been made since the program started late in Martin Harvey Baynes, Port-