Part 66, page 26
Document date 25 November 1971
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FBI 164-81, Vault Part 66 p. 26 (DB Cooper-277), Report, dated 25 Nov 1971 — cooper.theunsolved.net/parts/Cooper-Part-66/pages/26
Transcript
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Cabin lights [illegible] in forward cabin, OFF in [illegible]t cabin. Curtain between first class and tourist section was closed; crew could not see whether HJ was still aboard.
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2222* Lost communications on NWA communications frequency (131.9); 'phone-patch with SEA/ARINC established. Flight now 23 DME S PDX at 10,000', 40,000# fuel aboard, 165KIAS, FF and con- figuration remained the same. Crew had previously been ad- vised to switch to ARINC on 131.8 when NWA communications lost. MSPFO and MSPFD communicated with flight and SEA ARINC thereafter on this 'phone-patch arrangement. SEADD had been monitoring all communications with flight and assis- ting in all other matters.
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[REDACTED] had also been very actively participating throughout the high-jacking. He had taken money and 'chutes to air- plane at SEA, coordinated with crew, fuel trucks, etc.
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[REDACTED] later called UAL at RNO and briefed them on all of the HJ's demands, procedures to be followed at RNO, etc.
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2252 Flight over EUG VOR, 10,000', 170KIAS, fuel aboard 33,500#, FF and configuration remained the same. Advised that they had had no communications with the HJ for "about the last 55 minutes" despite several attempts on cockpit-to-cabin inter-phone and PA system. Crew was assured that fuel was more than adequate to get to RNO, that RNO weather was good, etc. SEADD had also been actively following, and participating in these events.
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2328 Over MFR, 10,000', TAT -5°, 170KIAS, fuel aboard 27,500#, FF and configuration the same. Some airframe icing being experienced. Engine anti-icing ON for appreciable length of time, wing AI on "intermittently". Crew seemed slightly concerned about this, but were assured that it was no problem.
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2330* [REDACTED] asked that we sug- gest that flight crew slowly lower cabin temperature as much as practicable (to slow HJ's reflexes).
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2335* MSPFO suggested a slow climb to 11,000' at Captain's dis- cretion, to induce as much hypoxia in HJ as possible (flight had previously been suggested to consider climb to as high as practicable--but that they would probably be performance lim- ited to not much above 17,000'--but not above 12,500'. Latter upper limit to prevent a cabin oxygen mask drop from excit- ing HJ. 11,000' also needed for adequate terrain clearance RBL-RNO.
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DB Cooper-277-15