Part 90, page 83

Transcript

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point during the conference call, learned (it is not known from [redacted] at a [redacted] operated a parachute jumping school at [redacted] and that he had previously been [redacted]

McAFO advised conference call participants that N A would hang up if they were no longer needed on that line. Was asked to standby by either FAA or FBI Washington. Did so.

FAA/FBI advised McAFO that no further conference call info was required of N A at that time. hung up. (Prior to our hanging up, [redacted] advised FAA Washington on same line that he also was "signing off".)

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[Ab]out the flight from the time it was known that the HJ's desired action was HEX, preparations were made for a landing at YUM, and [illegible], Mexico, as would have been necessary due to the limited range HJ's specified configuration. Prior to the ENO landing McAFO [advis]ed that crew negotiate with HJ to pull gear and flaps UP after take-off, that a non-stop flight to MEX would then be possible. of course, proved unnecessary.

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Throughout the whole operation, excellent cooperation was received [from] all concerned (except HJ?), including The Boeing Company, SEA, and MNC, ATC, SEA and RNO Towers, local FBI and Air Marshal person- nel all the experts that furnished help.

[There] is no doubt but that the flight crew did a truly excellent job throughout.

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Northwest Airlines, Inc. [redacted] (office) [redacted] (home)

[Times] marked with an asterisk (*) are approximate, but believed to be [accur]ate within approximately ±3 minutes. All other times are be- lieved to be accurate within ±1 minute.

11/25/71

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