Northwest Airlines chronological log of communications during hijacking of Flight 305

The attached information was taken primarily from manually recorded notes during communications con- nected with the high-jacking of Northwest Airlines Flight 305, November 24/25, 1971.

The primary method of communication with the flight was direct between NWPO (Flight Operations) and SEADD (Flight Dispatch), the flight, SEA, and SFO ARINC, RNO Tower.

Due to the inability to copy everything exactly-- and as rapidly--as it occurred, there may be some errors in the following. It is not believed that they are likely to be large or significant.

The following also includes additional informa- tion that developed during the incident that appeared relevant.

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11/25/71

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DB Cooper-40068

the following information [redacted] from various sources, p[redacted]arily the radio and phone-patch communications between the MSP Flight Operations Office "Eagle" and the flight crew.

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ire (CST)*

1658 Flight OFF PDX. High-jacker (HJ) apparently made his demands known shortly after this time.

Preliminary information received from MSP Planning Office (MSPPO):

HJ demanding $200,000 (denomination not restricted), 2 chest-pack parachutes, 7 back-pack parachutes. All to be available and ready at airplane parking site before landing will be permitted at SEA.

Apparently has a bomb in briefcase. Passenger apparently boarded at PDX.

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1720* Crew advised they would hold over Lofall intersection until all material available. No info yet on destination HJ desired; after SEA T.O. HJ had said there was to be no "funny stuff" at any time or he would detonate the bomb. Specified that only the fuel truck, air-stair truck, and automobile with the money and 'chutes approach the airplane. That airplane be parked in an "isolated" position. Gave a deadline of 1900 CST for all demands to be met. HJ remained in tourist cabin with one stewardess sitting next to him and aware of what appeared to be a bomb (dynamite sticks, wire, battery). Pas- sengers not advised that high-jacking in progress, but that reason for the holding was "minor mechanical problem".

Crew described passenger as white, 6' 1", black hair, 175#, approximately 50, black suit, black rain coat, black brief case. (All information between cockpit and HJ being relayed by "captive" stewardess[redacted] by cabin/cockpit interphone.) b6 b7C

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HJ specified that no vehicles with beacons or flashing red lights or any other were to approach airplane. MSPFO agreed that captain was in full command and all his requests and wishes would be honored. Crew taking pains likewise to gain HJ's confidence by giving him full information and coopera- tion.

hJ also specified that, after SEA landing and parking;

- Fueling to start as soon as engines shut down. DB Cooper-40069 - Stewardess[redacted] would leave airplane (and only her) b6 and pick up money, then return for 'chutes. He must b7C see knapsack with money before any other steps taken. - Passengers will be allowed off after money and chutes are in his possession and fueling under way. - 3 -

930 ; Airplane landed [illegible] after crew and hJ assured that money and 'chutes were available and in position.

Crew requested car park at 10 to 11 o'clock position to air- plane so they could see it properly.

Notes indicate HJ indicated at one time that airplane was open to "any number of vehicles as long as no 'funny stuff' pulled."

Direct communications between crew and MSPFO maintained at all times. Coordination between Tower, vehicles, and air- plane on ground at SEA were on Ground Control frequency 121.7.

First fuel truck apparently ran out of fuel. Crew requested second truck, with third one to be standing by. Considerable delay in getting full load of fuel and HJ was getting "nervous", saying that you must "get the show on the road".

HJ specified that he wanted to go to Mexico City non-stop, that the aircraft configuration must be gear DOWN, flaps at 15°, that the aft entry door must be open at all times, and that the aft stairs be extended after take-off. Later speci- fied that stairs must be fully extended before take-off. MSPFO advised crew (1) that non-stop SEA-MEX impossible with gear DOWN, flaps 15°, (2) that take-off with air-stairs full down impossible due to inability to rotate airplane. Then hJ advised of this he asked that air-stairs be partially ex- tended prior to take-off. MSPFO advised this also impossible since stairs could not be held in any intermediate position.

HJ had previously stated that no landing within continental U.S. would be permitted "for fuel or anything else". When advised of range limitation in his specified configuration, he agreed to something short of the border. Asked about PHX, advised by MSPFO that this might be within range but that RNO would be better as far as range was concerned. Agreed to this without much, if any, objection.

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136 Airplane OFF at SEA.

140 14 DME S SEA VOR at 7000'. Gear DOWN, flaps extending to 30°.

141* Stewardess [redacted] allowed to go to cockpit. b6 b7C

142* HJ advised (by inter-phone) that he was having difficulty get- ting steps down.

143 Aft air-stair warning light ON (stairs apparently now partially extended.) Crew had been furnished Boeing procedure for exten- ding stairs in flight. Airplane now 19 DME S SEA VOR on V23, with gear DOWN, flaps at 30°, and at APPROACH speed.

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- 4 - DB Cooper-40070

NWA Chief Performance Engineer had been called to field to help calculate range, etc. Boeing Company had been contacted for assistance in range problem, flight characteristics with air-stairs extended, whether opening (stairs extend about 20° in flight, possibly more with man's weight on them) would be large enough for a man to exit. Boeing assured us there would be no controllability problem, that they would get experts work- ing on range problem also, that they had dropped 2-300# boxes out air-stair opening in flight and that man could probably get out.

R A Communications people also had arrived at field to assist if required 'phone-patch ing, other communications problems.

Mr. Nyrop, [illegible] four supervisory pilots, 1 performance engineer, many others on the scene (MSPFO) for assistance.

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Flight at 7000', 160KIAS, fuel flow (P?) 4500#/engine, flaps 30° gear MN. MSPFO advised they would have even more severely limited range in the flaps 30° position. Crew given prelimin- ary information on optimum range IAS (170K), weather, air- ports available between SEA and RNO, minimum obstruction clearance altitudes, etc.

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MSPFO asked for stewardess best recollection of exact content of h.j briefcase. She got on radio and gave following basic information:

- Eight red sticks, about 5" x 1" in left corner of brief case, "look like big firecrackers." Two rows of sticks, four on top of four. - Wire attached to dynamite with red insulation. - Battery "like flashlight battery, but about 6" high and as big around as my arm". - Red sticks are about the color "of my uniform".

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Crew called h.j and asked him if everything was O.K. and he replied that it was. This was apparently the last communi- cation the crew had with the h.j.

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Crew reported oscillation of cabin rate of climb indicator. This probably due to h.j weight now on stairs, stairs extending further, resultant effect on cabin pressure. May be best estimate of when he exited airplane.

MSPFO advised crew that range to RNO now looked good (air- plane now at 10,000', 170K, gear DOWN, flaps 15°, FF 4000+/ hour/engine. TAT -7°C. MSPFO calculated TAS and range from this data.

cabin lights ON in forward cabin, OFF in aft cabin. Curtain between first cl[redacted] and tourist section was [redacted]losed; crew could not see whether HJ was still aboard.

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Last communications on HF A communications frequency (131.9); 'phone-patch with SEA ARINC established. Flight now 23 DME S PDX at 10,000', 40,000 f[ue]l aboard, 165KIAS, FF and con- figuration remained the same. Crew had previously been ad- vised to switch to ARINC on 131.8 when F/A communications lost. MSPFO and MSPFD communicated with flight and SEA AR NC thereafter on this 'phone-patch arrangement. SEADD had been monitoring all communications with flight and assis- ting in all other matters.

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[REDACTED] had also been very actively participating throughout the high-jacking. he had taken money and 'chutes to air- plane at SEA, coordinated with crew, fuel trucks, etc.

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[REDACTED] later called W.L at RNO and briefed them on all of the HJ's demands, procedures to be followed at RNO, etc.

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Flight over [guess: EUR] VOR, 10,000', 170KIAS, fuel aboard 33,500#, FF and configuration remained the same. Advised that they had had no communications with the HJ for "about the last 55 minutes" despite several attempts on cockpit-to-cabin inter-phone and PA system. Crew was assured that fuel was more than adequate to get to RNO, that RNO weather was good, etc. SEADD had also been actively following, and participating in these events.

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Over IFR, 10,000', TAT -5°, 170KIAS, fuel aboard 27,500#. FF and configuration the same. Some airframe icing [guess: being] [guess: ixing] experienced. Engine anti-icing ON for appreciable length of time, wing AI on "intermittently". Crew seemed slightly concerned about this, but were assured that it was no problem.

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[REDACTED] asked that we sug- gest that flight crew slowly lower cabin temperature as much as practicable (to slow HJ's reflexes).

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MSPFO suggested a slow climb to 11,000' at Captain's dis- cretion, to induce as much hypoxia in HJ as possible (flight had previously been suggested to consider climb to as high as practicable--but that they would probably be performance lim- ited to not much above 17,000'--but not above 12,500'. Latter upper limit to prevent a cabin oxygen mask drop from excit- ing HJ. 11,000' also needed for adequate terrain clearance NRL-RNO.

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b6 b7C

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DB Cooper-40072

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When flight was in RBL area, direct communications between MSPFO and the flight were interrupted. UAL 4531 and UAL 328 relayed messages [illegible] and from the flight for [illegible].

Flight now at 11,000', TAT -1°, all other factor essentially the same.

58 DME N RBL VOR, 11,000', fuel aboard 22,000#. Only evidence from cabin was aft entry door and air-stair warning lights still ON.

Flight switched to SFO ARINC on 130.6. MSPFO put on 'phone- patch this frequency at same time.

Fuel aboard 17,300#.

Descent from 11,000 to 9,000' started.

Flight advised they were holding at MNO ON until they had everything "in order".

Flight 1 mile out on final approach. (At this time, we+- MSPFO--were on telephone conference call. Other parties apparently on the same line were RNO Tower, FAA SEA, FAA Washington, FBI Washington. Not known whether anyone else might have also been tuned in.)

Tower "talked us through" his touchdown, subsequent taxi- ing. Door did not appear to go to full down position until relatively low speed on roll-out. Flaps appeared to be "UP". Parked at NE (?) corner of terminal ramp.

Tower reported crew had exited airplane; with FBI at this time.

After parking, crew had advised on SFO ARINC that one of them had gone back in cabin and found no sign of h.j. They had apparently last tried to contact him via interphone/PA at about 0046CST with no response. At that time they were going to advise him that the air-stair would have to be retracted for landing or that damage during landing roll-out would probably prevent subsequent take-off.

Two "little" 'chutes gone, one "big" one cut up, appar- ently to tie the money with shroud lines to h.j. One "big" 'chute apparently still on the airplane.

Guard requested around airplane, FBI apparently searching airplane.

Was advised (all on conference call) at this time that matter was now under the jurisdiction of FBI in Washington. - 7 - DB Cooper-40073

point during the conference call, learned (it is not known from [redacted] at a [redacted] operated a parachute jumping school at [redacted] and that he had previously been [redacted]

McAFO advised conference call participants that N A would hang up if they were no longer needed on that line. Was asked to standby by either FAA or FBI Washington. Did so.

FAA/FBI advised McAFO that no further conference call info was required of N A at that time. hung up. (Prior to our hanging up, [redacted] advised FAA Washington on same line that he also was "signing off".)

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[Ab]out the flight from the time it was known that the HJ's desired action was HEX, preparations were made for a landing at YUM, and [illegible], Mexico, as would have been necessary due to the limited range HJ's specified configuration. Prior to the ENO landing McAFO [advis]ed that crew negotiate with HJ to pull gear and flaps UP after take-off, that a non-stop flight to MEX would then be possible. of course, proved unnecessary.

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Throughout the whole operation, excellent cooperation was received [from] all concerned (except HJ?), including The Boeing Company, SEA, and MNC, ATC, SEA and RNO Towers, local FBI and Air Marshal person- nel all the experts that furnished help.

[There] is no doubt but that the flight crew did a truly excellent job throughout.

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Northwest Airlines, Inc. [redacted] (office) [redacted] (home)

[Times] marked with an asterisk (*) are approximate, but believed to be [accur]ate within approximately ±3 minutes. All other times are be- lieved to be accurate within ±1 minute.

11/25/71

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